What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War by Manning, Chandra
Civil War Book Review 
Summer 2007 Article 2 
What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War 
Chandra Manning 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr 
Recommended Citation 
Manning, Chandra (2007) "What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War," Civil War 
Book Review: Vol. 9 : Iss. 3 . 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol9/iss3/2 
Interview




Interview with Chandra Manning
Interviewed by Christopher Childers
Civil War Book Review (CWBR): Your book emphasizes the role of
slavery as the reason for the Civil Warùaccording to the soldiersùfrom the
beginning of the conflict. In contrast, some scholars have argued that in
1860 and 1861 politicians saw the war as a fight to either prevent or allow
the secession of part of the Unionùor, more broadly, as a conflict over states
rights. Most notably, they argue that Abraham Lincoln slowly drifted
toward a war against slavery. Should the political philosophy of soldiers in
blue and gray prompt us to take another look at when the Civil War became
a fight over slavery?
Chandra Manning (CM): I should note from the outset that soldiers
certainly prompted me to take another look at the relationship between the war
and slavery. When I started the project, I had no idea that slavery would be its
focus, and in fact, assumed slavery would be fairly peripheral for enlisted
soldiers, but the enlisted men whose mail I read finally persuaded me that I
needed to think anew. What I concluded was that when the war became a fight
over slavery, as well as how the war became a war over slavery differed for
different groups, so the political philosophy of ordinary enlisted men should
probably prompt us to ask the question a little more precisely, and should
probably persuade us to distinguish between a war over slavery and a war to end
slavery.
In one sense, everybody agrees it was about slavery from the outsetùthe
election of Abraham Lincoln on a platform explicitly prohibiting the expansion
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of slavery prompted the secession of seven states, each of which cited that
platform and a lack of confidence in the North's commitment to enforcing the
Fugitive Slave Law as reasons for secession, and secession, as everyone at the
time knew, meant war. Leaders in the seceding states were no less sure of that
than anyone else; they might have believed they had the right to secede, but
knew full well that it would not happen without war, just as it took war for the
thirteen colonies to gain independence. Once war came, slaves and free blacks
knew immediately that slavery lay at the heart of the conflict, and no amount of
official nay-saying convinced them otherwise. Confederate soldiers, right from
the outset, saw the war as necessary to prevent what they were sure the North
was really up to, and that was the destruction of an institution without which
they simply could not imagine their lives or homes or families being safe.
One of the war's many ironies is that the average white Northerner was up to
no such thing in the spring of 1861, because in April 1861, the average white
Northerner would have much preferred not to think about the issue of slavery at
all. In fact, one of few things enlisted men in both armies might have agreed on
after a few months in the ranks was, this blasted war happened over slavery
whether we like it or not, and the other side made it that way. The ordinary white
guy who enlisted in the Union Army in the spring of 1861 did care about what he
saw as the United States' experiment in self-government, which only works when
all parties agree to abide by election results, even when they don't like them.
Secession in response to distasteful election results would turn the United States
from the example for the world that soldiers had grown up believing their
country was supposed to be into a laughingstock for the world, and would doom
the rest of the world's hopes for self-government. Such ideas might sound
grandiose to us, and I confess it took me awhile to take them seriously, but after
awhile when you see regular guys writing about these kinds of ideas with such
feeling to the very people they can least put up a show in front of (parents,
spouses, or that toughest of audiences, siblings), you realize that to understand
the war from an enlisted Union soldier's point of view, you simply have to take
those ideas seriously. So when the ordinary Union soldier enlisted in 1861, those
were the ideas on his mind, and in that sense, the war was not primarily over
slavery for enlisted Union soldiers at first.
Yet two things changed white Union enlisted men's minds fast, and in that 
change I think we do perceive a command to revisit our ideas about the timing of 
the war's transition to a war to end slavery. Wartime service in seceded states 
and meeting white Southerners led Union soldiers to realize that after decades of
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tension, warùthe real thingùhad actually come. They concluded that what broke
up the Union was slavery, so if the Union was to remain intact or be restored and
if it was not to face similar peril all over again, the factor that had caused
secession had to be eradicated. The second factor was interaction with actual
slaves, whose suffering genuinely horrified many white Union soldiers. Even the
most hard-bitten of souls wrote home to say how much worse it was than he
thought, so when coupled with the institution's role in prompting secession (as
enlisted Union soldiers saw it), exposure to the misery of slavery changed minds.
These two factors did their work remarkably quicklyùwithin months of soldiers'
first arrival to the theater of war. The first big wave of changing opinion took
place when the first round of recruits had been in the field for a couple of
monthsùbetween August and December of 1861 to be exactùand in that sense,
yes, I think we really do need to revisit when we think the relationship between
the war and ending slavery began to congeal.
CWBR: Your research suggests that the soldiers who fought in the Civil
War had a far more sophisticated political worldview than historians have
previously considered. How would you describe their conception of and
commitment to republican government, which you argue that they fought to
defend? Did Union and Confederate soldiers link this ideal with the
preservation and prosperity of them and their families?
CM: I think soldiers had a more sophisticated worldview than historians 
writing in the mid- to late-twentieth century supposed, but I don't want to make 
myself sound like I am responsible for blazing entirely new trails on that score. I 
think our appreciation of soldiers' mental worlds has been increasing for about 
two decades now, as we move far enough away from later national experiences 
(especially the Vietnam War) to stop ourselves from reflexively imposing later 
experiences on the Civil War generation. Historians like Reid Mitchell and 
James McPherson in particular made it possible, even mandatory, for someone 
like me to take soldiers' ideas seriously, which is important because soldiers took 
their ideas about republican government seriously. I do sometimes find that 
readers or listeners resist the idea that regular soldiers thought or cared very 
much about why government should exist or what it should do, but I was very 
gratified yesterday when the father-in-law of a friend, who is not an historian but 
who received the book for Father's Day and has been reading it, volunteered over 
hotdogs at our Fourth of July barbeque that he had really enjoyed reading and 
thinking about the difference between Northerners' and Southerners' ways of 
thinking about government because the differences struck him as believable and
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relevant. So I think that the two decades of work by people who came before me
are beginning to pay off!
To get to the heart of the question: it seems clear to me that soldiers in both
armies took the American Revolution and its legacy seriously, and derived their
conceptions of government from it. To put it another way, both sides saw
themselves as defenders of the memory of the Revolution, but in both cases, the
memory was selective, and therefore different from, and even threatened by, how
the other side interpreted the memory.
Confederate troops were inclined to link the legacy of the Revolution
directly to the well-being and aspirations of themselves and their loved ones. The
Revolution established the precept that government existed to advance the
interests of white men and their families, and when it no longer did so, those
same white men had the right to rebel against that government. The preservation
of slavery was central to the material well-being of some white Southerners, but
even more pivotal to the safety of all white families who lived in a region where
40% of the population was black and (white Southerners worried) inclined to rise
up in violence against white Southerners, especially vulnerable women and
children, without the controlling mechanism of slavery in place.
One of my favorite Confederates, a Georgia soldier named Private Ivy
Duggan, insisted that if the colonists could rebel over a paltry tax on tea because
that tax proved that the British government did not represent colonists' interests,
then how much more right did white Southerners have to rebel against a
government that menaced slavery, an institution far more vital to white men and
their loved ones than untaxed tea was to colonists. To so much as criticize
slavery, Duggan claimed, was tantamount to unleashing arsonists and putting
weapons and poison into the hands of murderers; a government that implicitly
criticized slavery by vowing to stop its expansion, therefore, entitled white
Southerners to invoke the right of revolution invoked by the founding
generation, and the safety of their families demanded that they invoke it.
Duggan, incidentally, wrote in such a way in 1861 in central Georgia, a place
where no Union soldiers were remotely near at the time, quite possibly in
recognition of the fact that opinion among white Southerners about secession
was very divided early in the war, but opinion about the purpose of government,
belief in the importance of the American Revolution, and the centrality of family
were widespread, so linking the cause of the Confederacy to pre-existing beliefs
about republican government and to family made good sense.
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Union troops also placed great importance on the memory of the Revolution,
and they also cared about the well-being and aspirations of their families, but
they did not link the two in the same way as Confederate troops. To make this
distinction is emphatically not to say that white Northerners were somehow less
self-centered than white Southerners (for the record, since I have been
misunderstood on this point on more than one occasion, I think that most
groupings of human beings have roughly proportional shares of admirable and
less admirable people and generalizations about one group being more or less
selfish, generous, kind, honest, or any other adjective than another group strike
me as neither persuasive nor useful) but is to say that the relationship between
government, family, and individual worked differently for ordinary white
Northerners than it did for ordinary white Southerners.
What was important about the American Revolution was less the process by
which it happened (rebellion) than the government it created; so to honor and
keep the memory of the Revolution, the thing to do was to save what it had
created. Moreover the Union existed not just to advance the interests of white
men and their families, but for the grander purpose of proving to the world that
republican self-government based on the principles expressed in the Declaration
of Independence could work. To stand by and allow the Union created by the
American Revolution to self-destruct because some citizens did not like the way
an election turned out, as an ordinary Union enlistee saw it, was to betray the
experiment begun by the Founders and to dash the hopes of human beings
everywhere, because to do so would say that self-government does not work, so
don't bother to try it.
CWBR: You assiduously follow the mood and the morale of soldiers in
both Union and Confederate armies, with special attention to region and
local circumstances. How did military morale on the battlefield and politics
in the halls of government affect one another?
CM: The short answer is reciprocally. Both the Union and the Confederacy 
enacted conscription but the fact remained that both armies were 
overwhelmingly volunteer armies (even if many soldiers volunteered primarily 
to avoid getting drafted) manned by recruits who saw themselves as citizens who 
kept civilian rights, particularly the right of dissent. Moreover, the Union and the 
Confederacy were both democratic societies in which the military remained 
subject to civil authority and in which that civil authority consisted of elected
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leaders who answered to constituents and got their jobs by winning elections in
which, by the middle of the war, soldiers as well as civilians voted. What all of
this means is that public opinion mattered in how the war was fought. To cite
some examples: Lincoln famously overturned FrΘmont's Proclamation in part to
assuage Border State public opinion and keep Kentucky and Missouri in the
Union, and he delayed issuance of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation
until after a battle that could at least be pitched as a Union victory. Vicksburg
mattered for the Unionùenough to be the object of a long and costly
campaignùfor lots of tactical and strategic reasons, but also because Midwestern
farmers sought the restoration of the Mississippi River as a conduit for shipping
produce. Confederate troop allocations were products of military needs, but also
of public demand for home guards to prevent slave insurrection.
At the same time, voting publics knew there was a war on, and they wanted
most of all to win that war. When the war went well militarily, election results
often favored those in power, and when the war was not going well militarily,
election results often favored the opposition, in both the Union and the
Confederacy. Because they fought the war, voted for leaders (though when they
did that varied from state to state), and especially because they wrote letters
home to other potential voters and members of the public, many soldiers
explicitly saw themselves as actively shaping the war. They did not feel that way
every day of course, and plenty of times they railed against feeling like cogs
caught up in senseless wheels (as enlisted men since time immemorial have
done, I suspect), but nonetheless a striking sense seemed to exist that by
persuading the folks at home to see the war their way, soldiers helped to shape
the war they fought.
CWBR: The link between soldiers' conceptions of the war as a fight over
slavery and their own racial predilections seems, at times, tortured. How did
soldiers, particularly in the Union, reconcile their cause and their views on
race, or did they?
CM: The link for Confederate soldiers and for black Union soldiers was
always pretty clear and straightforward: for them, slavery and race were
inextricable which for Confederate troops meant that slavery was necessary as a
form of race control (among other things) and for black Union troops meant that
every black American, even those born free, had a stake in the end of slavery.
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White Union soldiers are often the toughest for us to understand because we
naturally assume slavery and race to be intertwined, but white enlisted Union
men kept the two topics quite separate. Slavery the institution could be thought
about abstractlyùas a source of political power for white Southerners, as a source
of political conflict, perhaps even a moral embarrassment, but above all, as the
reason for secession and warùand when thought about abstractly, it was not
particularly taxing to call for an end to the institution that had caused so much
trouble, especially for men not personally invested in it. The magnitude of
calling for an end to slavery should not be underestimated; the United States was
a slaveholding nation, even if slaves lived only in the southern portion of it,
which is to say that governance, foreign policy, economy, and more were shaped
by the existence of slavery for everyone who lived in the United States, not just
for people who lived in the South.
Still, the end of the nstitution that had brought about the war could be
thought about in pragmatic terms even by men who assumed, as most white
Northerners did, that black people were not equal to white people. For that
reason, plenty of white Union troops called for an end to slavery even as they
voiced racist opinions about black Americans' inferior qualities and unfitness for
civil rights. The continued racism has led us to miss the early timing and
underestimate the strength of the rank-and-file's demands for an end to slavery
because we have assumed that anyone passing such racist remarks must have
been all for slavery, or at least opposed to emancipation, but those assumptions
are a function of our own presentism, not sound interpretations of what was
going on in the rank-and-file. To put it another way, it was perfectly possible for
the same white Union soldier to vehemently demand an end to slavery and to
insist that blacks were inferior to whites, or even to claim to dislike all black
people. The co-existence of pro-emancipation sentiment and racism seems
strange to us, but perfectly normal to them, especially since before the war most
of them knew few or no black people.
That co-existence did become harder to sustain as the war dragged on, and 
got more and more gruesome, at least for some Union troops. The escalation of 
the war began to inspire some troops to see the awfulness of the war as God's 
punishment on the entire nation and in trying to figure out what Northerners as 
well as Southerners were being punished for, some began to see northern 
complicity in slavery through the widespread racism that enabled whites in the 
non-slaveholding states to go along with slavery for so long. That particular 
calculus had begun to form before the summer of 1863, but it received a real
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boost on the 4th of July, when Vicksburg fell and when Lee's Army headed
south after Gettysburg on the same day.
The concurrence of those two events on Independence Day, no less, could
not just be chance, soldier after soldier reasoned, but must be the work of God.
But what did it mean? Even though Vicksburg and Gettysburg were Union
victories, soldiers did not just respond with the sort of see, God is on our side
rhetoric we might expect, but rather because both campaigns had been so costly,
they discerned a more complicated message that went something like: clearly
God wants the Union to win in the long run, but not until the Union deserves to
win, which it won't do until it recognizes and atones for whatever it has done that
has angered God enough to send this awful war, and what it has done must have
to do with northern whites' complicity in the war's cause, slavery. In the summer
of 1863, then, certainly not all but a surprising number of soldiers began to look
seriously at their own racial attitudes.
In contrast to Union soldiers' perception that slavery must go in order for the
Union to win the warùwhich remained strong throughout the warùnew ideas
about civil rights proved much more fragile. When the war went badly, soldiers
could revert to their old attitudes. Conversely, at the end when Union victory
began to look imminent, some decided that there was no need for such radical
change after all. Both types of back-sliding show that the urge to keep the issues
of slavery and race separate remained strong even as the war itself called that
separation into question.
CWBR: How did Confederate soldiers grapple with the nature of the
Civil War as a crusade against their peculiar institution, especially as the
military battles began to turn against them? Did they resent fighting for
slavery, especially when many of them owned no slaves themselves?
CM: I certainly expected them to, but I was wrong. When I began this 
project, I did not set out to write about what soldiers thought about slavery 
because I did not think slavery would be so central to their war. I especially 
assumed that slavery would not be central to the non-slaveholding Confederates 
who made up the bulk of the enlisted ranks, and in whom I was interested. 
Insofar as I thought about nonslaveholders and slavery, I assumed the story 
would be one in which ordinary white southern men discovered that they had 
been tricked and misled into a war over slavery, and then gradually withdrew 
their loyalty in response to that discovery and to the military course of the war
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itself. In making that assumption I was guilty of a habit that I particularly dislike
and try to discourage among students, and that is the habit of patronization. It is
condescending and patronizing to the men who filled the Confederate ranks to
assume that they were oblivious to the plainly worded ordinances of secession,
or to the strident editorials, or to the hundred and one other sources explaining
why secession was necessary to protect slavery, and it is even more patronizing
and condescending to explain the war away as about just about anything other
than slavery when soldiers themselves did no such thing, and I am embarrassed
to admit it, but I was guilty of that very condescension. The good news is I got
over it, because soldiers left me no choice, especially when the course of the war
became so trying. There is no question that non-slaveholders sometimes resented
slaveholders, but that did not translate into resentment of the institution itself,
because non-slaveholders saw the survival of that institution as necessary to the
survival of everything that mattered to them. The Confederate conception of the
purpose of government bequeathed from the Revolution as the promotion of the
best interests of white men and their families worked fine when the Confederate
government did not need to place demands on white men and their families. But
as the needs of the Confederacy increasingly conflicted with the best interests of
white families and resulted in policies like conscription, impressment, and
tax-in-kind, the logic of secession would say that the Confederate government
had forfeited its reason for existence and its claims on white Southerners'
loyalties.
Yet for four long and very punishing years, non-slaveholding soldiers did
not invoke that logic, although many came close when the war went badly, when
the Confederate government did something they did not like, and especially
when their families were in need. What pulled them back? Partly of course the
momentum of war itself, but even more effective was the reminder that no matter
how bad the Confederacy was and how awful the war was, life in the Union
would be worse because it would mean abolition and abolition was the very
worst thing that could happen to their families because it would destroy the
world as they knew it and threaten the very lives of their loved ones. That
conviction served as a sort of glue that helped non-slaveholders continue to
adhere to a war and a cause that on the surface appear to have little to do with
them.
CWBR: Your narrative points to the racial beliefs of the northern home 
front during the war vis-α-vis the soldiers' ideas. Does your research 
suggest that Union soldiers acted as a vanguard of revised notions on race in
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the North?
CM: I think that enlisted Union soldiers' views on race were fundamentally
challenged and definitely underwent change as a result of the experiences of
serving in the war, seeing slaves and slavery, and the performance of black
Union soldiers, but my jury is still out on whether we can think of white Union
soldiers as a genuine vanguard, because that would suggest they led to a place
that the home front got to later, but did eventually reach. I am not sure that
soldiers themselves stayed in that place or that the home front ever really got
there. They might have, but I don't feel that I really know. I am in fact trying to
envision a project that will let me examine that very question furtherùso check
back in a few years on that one! What my research does suggest is that the
question you are asking is one of the most important ones facing us in
understanding the war and its aftermath.
CWBR: Your narrative suggests a tragic postlude to the Civil War era:
that the progressive ideology that prompted many Union soldiers to fight
against slavery did not survive the turbulent Reconstruction years. Where
were the soldiers in the postwar years and did they play any role in
reuniting the republic under a new racial order?
CM: What happened to soldiers after the war, as I suggested above, really
does strike me as an area we need to revisit much more intensely. Much of the
work on the memory of the war certainly sees soldiers and the phenomenon of
peaceful reunion at the cost of whites North and South agreeing to ignore slavery
as central to the post-Reconstruction racial order, which may very well be the
case, but I think we have seen that outcome as inevitable because we have
missed or at least minimized how much serious rethinking so many white Union
soldiers really did during the war. In other words, we have assumed that they
didn't change very much in their racial attitudes, so we should not be surprised
that by the reunion at Gettysburg in 1913 it was fine with white Union as well as
Confederate veterans to make the event a whites only affair and pretend black
soldiers did not exist. I am no longer convinced of the inevitability. I think that
views did change, or at least proved susceptible to change, but then changed
back, and I wish I knew a lot more about precisely when, how, and why.
CWBR: You have crafted this narrative from a massive amount of 
archival research from scores of archives that reveals the lives of over a 
thousand Union and Confederate soldiers. How did your organize and
10
Civil War Book Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol9/iss3/2
synthesize this mountain of data?
CM: To keep track of soldiers, I created a data sheet for each in which I
entered details like birthday, hometown, occupation, father's occupation, marital
status, close family members (wife and children, or parents and siblings for
unmarried men), date of enlistment, rank, regiment, places served, battles fought,
and events like promotion, capture, wounding, illness, and death. Then I just
kept the data sheets filed alphabetically within the Union and Confederate
armies.
To keep track of what soldiers were saying, I devised a somewhat more
elaborate system that would help me spot patterns and change over time. I
developed the system because soldiers were not behaving at all as I expected
them to. Initially, I thought I would write a study comparing Union and
Confederate soldiers, but also comparing regional differences within the Union
and Confederate armies and I would end up writing something about region,
localism, and loyalty in the 19th century United States (I know, it even sounds
like something only a graduate student could love). But as I sat in the archives
reading dead guys' mail, I kept finding myself struck by the urgency with which
they discussed the very topic I thought they would avoidùslavery. I was not sure,
though, if I was spotting a real pattern, or if I was just noticing anomalies
because they departed from my expectations and so surprised me more.
So I decided to create a document for every topic I saw soldiers discussing
frequently (with the exception of the weather and their intestinal travails, both
perennially favorite topics that I did not particularly want to write about) and
then start transcribing relevant parts of letters, diary entries, and regimental
newspapers chronologically within the document. In other words, I had a
document on politics, one on patriotism, one on slavery, and five or six other
topics. If I was reading a letter from July 6, 1864, in which a North Carolinian
discussed the upcoming gubernatorial election, parallels with the American
Revolution, and his fears of race war if slavery ended, then I would enter the part
about the governor's election in the politics document between July 5 and July 7
entries, the part about the Revolution in the patriotism document between July 5
and July 7 entries, and the part about slavery in the slavery document between
July 5 and July 7 entries. I also included full citations so that if I ended up using
the passage, I would be sure to go back and read the passage in the context of the
full letter to make sure I was not misinterpreting or taking the soldier's thoughts
out of context. I kept Union and Confederate soldiers in the same document, but
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I used one font for Union soldiers and another font for Confederate soldiers so I
could compare the two easily.
That technique is what first alerted me to the importance of the slavery issue
to soldiers, since that file quickly grew to my thickest. The chronological
organization also helped me to track change over time; that was how I first
spotted the shift that began between August and December 1861, and it was also
how I could chart rises and falls in morale. Finally, the organization helped me
identify actual patterns as opposed to anomalies. Because both armies consisted
of men who thought of themselves as citizen-soldiers who retained the right to
their own opinions, dissent and disagreement remained a steady presence in both
armies, which meant that I needed to set a standard for figuring out how to tell if
one point of view really was dominant or not. The standard I chose was that the
prevailing view had to outnumber the dissenting view by a factor of three to one.
My long topic documents helped me to figure the ratio of opinion for any given
question, and determine if it met my three to one standard.
CWBR: What is the primary belief of historians that you attempt to
correct or revise with this work?
CM: I would certainly like to rectify some of the misperceptions that I
started out with myself. I would like the book to aid in dislodging the assumption
that non-slaveholding Confederates didn't care about or fight to protect slavery
and instead help historians and readers to understand why slavery would seem
important enough for ordinary white Southerners, including good and kind men
who cared most in the world about their own families, to fight to protect. I would
like the book to play a part in undoing the spell that McClellan had cast over me
(and others) with his 1862 Harrison's Landing letter in which he warned Lincoln
that radical views on slavery would disband the Union Army. McClellan
consistently overestimated the odds against any move he himself did not favor,
so I should have been able to see his bluff for what it was, but I didn't until
enlisted white Union soldier after enlisted white Union soldier finally alerted me
to the shift that began to take place in the last four months of 1861. So with that
in mind, I would like the book to help revise our understanding of the timing of
the war's transition to a war to end slavery, and I would like to contribute to a
more precise understanding of precisely how that transition happened with
attention to the roles of enlisted Union soldiers as connectors between the actions
and determination of slaves and the measures taken by Lincoln and Union
political and military leaders to eventually end slavery.
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I would love it if the book would serve as a reminder that about 10% of the
Union Army was black, and we can't talk about Union soldiers without talking
about black Union soldiers. I would like it if the book made it seem less like a
given that black men would fight for the Union; it should not be at all apparent
that black men would choose to fight to save a government that had enabled and
thrived on the enslavement of members of their race for its entire existence.
Hopefully, we will look more closely and think more clearly about what black
troops hoped the war would achieve, and recover the real sense of possibility that
seemed to exist for many black soldiers in the spring of 1865, so that we see the
subsequent loss of that sense as less of a given and more of a pressing question
that still awaits our attention.
CWBR: Thank you.
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